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In a competitive game situation where the only Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies, persistent
cyclic social rotation can be expected. The rotation is pointed out firstly by Shapley (1964) as never-
ending cycle and in discrete condition called as Shapley-ploygon. To insight into the rotation is long
time expectation. Data comes from an 13 groups, 825 rounds and 7 games experiment, which are of
random matching two-persons zero-sum extended 2×2 games (Binmore, Swierzbinski and Proulx,
2001 [1]). Whenever the payoff matrix is switched by the experimenters, we find, the human subjects
social rotations’ directions and strengths is changed simultaneously. The directions of rotation can
be captured by evolutionary dynamics; meanwhile, an explanation for observed rotation strengths
is also given with eigenvalues calculated from the Jacobian of normalized replicator dynamics. In
addition, equality-of-populations rank test shows that relative response coefficients within groups
differ and persist cross the parameters switching. In the old data, we demonstrate a new view —
rotation — to insight the Shapley-cyclic motion strength quantitatively.
PACS numbers: 05.40.-a, 05.70.Ln, 45.70.Vn
1. INTRODUCTION
In theoretical economic history, Shapley’s the never-ending cycle in game (Shapley, 1964), as the Edgeworth cycle in
price (Edgeworth, 1925), is a deep insight into stochastic processes of social evolution [2]. Shapley never-ending cycle
(now called as Shapley-polygon) state that, in a competitive situation where the only Nash equilibrium is in mixed
strategies, persistent cycles can be expected [2]. The unstable equilibrium has been strongly linking to evolutionary
game theory (EGT) and learning processes [2–4] in the past decades.
Experimental economics can be a method for theory testing [5, 6]. To the best of our knowledge, the Shapley-
polygon has rare been well experimental tested. Only closing experimental literature comes from Cason, Friedman and
Hopkins [4]. The strength of rotation of Shapley-polygon has never been reported. In this letter, in old experimental
data of zero-sums games [1], we report that, not only the direction, but also the strength of social rotation can be
distinguished, and even more, quantitatively, the results support the predictions from Shapley-polygon and EGT.
This report starts from the Binmore, Swierzbinski and Proulx’s experiment [1]. The experiment is repeated in
13 groups. Each group contains 12 human subjects which are split into two populations to play random matching
two-person companion 2×2 games. Interesting is that, there are exists 7 different incentives (payoff matrix) along the
825 rounds game, or, the incentives parameter changes 6 times along the 825 periods (see Figure 1). This switching
parameters experiment provides us a chance to insight (1) the changing direction and strength of social cyclic motions,
and even more, (2) the inherence (relative dynamical response coefficient) of the social groups’ dynamic property,
quantitatively.
After introducing the measurement method and the experiment in section 2, in section 3 we show that (1) not only
the direction but also the strength of the social rotation can be quantitatively distinguished; and (2) the diversity of
the response coefficient cross the groups can be distinguished. In section 4, a potential theoretical explanation linking
the strength of rotation to the payoff matrix is provided quantitatively, and then, discuss and summary last.
2. MEASUREMENT AND DATA
As a dynamics model, EGT offers short run predictions where classic game theory has little to say. Quantitative,
in the 2×2-like MSNE games [1], EGT predicts the evolution cyclic trajectory and rotation globally. To capture the
rotation, quantitatively, is the main propose of this paper. The measurement for the rotation is introduced following.
∗ Corresponding author: wangzj@zju.edu.cn. The two author contribution equal.
2Strategy Space and Social Evolution
For simple and clarity, we start from two-dimensional state space for two-population random matching two-persons
2×2 games. In EGT analogy [7], social output can be described by the state space, the states and time. In the game,
there exists two roles and each role includes some agents. For the first population X , the strategy set is {X1,X2}
for each agent; similarly, for the second population Y , {Y1,Y2}. Numerically, as ref. [8], we denote the strategy of
X1 (up strategy) and Y1 (left strategy) as 1 following. The payoff matrix, as an example, is shown in Fig. 1(b).
For a given the payoff matrix, the solution of an evolutionary dynamics model can be seen in Fig. 1(c) [9] and two
experimental trajectories can be seen in Fig. 2(b) [1]. If there are N=6 agents in each population, an observable
instantaneous populations strategy state should be x:=(p, q) ∈ X, herein X is the populations strategy state space
and X={0, 1
6
, 2
6
, . . . , 1} × {0, 1
6
, 2
6
, . . . , 1}, and p (q) is the density of X1 (Y1) in X (Y ). The strategy space is always
an unit square.
Figure 2(c) is an illustration for the state space of a 6+6 two-population 2×2 game. The unit square 7 × 7 lattice
(gray dots) is the state space X; In Fig. 2(a), A is the xA=(
5
6
, 1
6
) is a state which means that 5
6
in population X choice
X1 meanwhile
1
6
in population Y choice Y1.
In an experimental economics session, at each round, t, there is one dot of observation of x(t) in X. The vector,
x(t), is an indicator of collective social behavior at t. The smallest tick △t is 1 and is the interval within the successive
two rounds. Round by round, the dot (x(t)) should jump in the lattice and should form a trajectory. Figure 2(b)
is an empirical example of a trajectory. The experimental system can be seen as a discrete-space and discrete-time
population dynamics system.
We investigate social dynamics in existed experimental data. Qualitatively, the authors [1] confirm that, in the
trajectories in some sessions, as expected by evolutionary game theory or as Shapley (1964) cycle prediction, motion
spiral pattern exists. We go one step ahead. Quantitatively, we find the strength of the social motion spiral can be
distinguished and fit evolutionary game theory better than ever known.
Measurement for Rotation
We are interested in the rotation observable – a vector (L) called as rotation – an indicator for the direction
and the strength of the social evolutionary motion (or say as, the collective social dynamic behavior). In a two-
population random matching two-persons 2×2 game, L can be seen as a one-dimensional vector perpendicular to the
two-dimensional state space.
At experimental round t, the instantaneous rotation L(t) can be expressed as
L(t) = x(t)⊗ x(t + 1), (1)
where x(t) is the strategy vector at time t, the ⊗ is cross product within the two strategy vectors. An example of an
instantaneous rotation L(t) is shown in Fig. 2(a). Denoting T as the total number of rounds in game (α) in group
(β), the accumulated L (denoted as La) is Laα,β =
∑T−1
t=0 L(t) in which T is the total periods of the game α of the
human subjects group β. The mean instantaneous rotation can be denoted as L¯α,β = L
a
α,β/T . A simplest picture is,
L¯α,β should depend on both α (an exogenous incentive of the experimental parameter setting) and β (the inherence
of a social group). If L¯α,β > 0, the rotation is counterclockwise; alternatively, clockwise.
We briefly explain the rotation observable L¯α,β here. Given same α, if L¯.,β 6= L¯.,β′, we can say, the ”social material”
β is unequal to β′, or say, the response coefficients of the materials differ. Meanwhile, given same β, changing α is
changing incentive, and then, the strength of rotation should be changed. In statistical physics language, L¯ relates to
probability current or flux in state space. This observable relates Shapley polygon [10] and stability of social dynamics
(e.g., [4]). This observable can also be imaged as angular momentum, one of the most fundamental variable in physics,
but set mass term as 1.
Data from Switching Parameter Experiments
The controlled parameters in experimental games are of the payoff matrix. The original payoff matrix can be seen in
Figure 1(a) in which the row players’s payoff is given; the column player’s payoff is its opposite value; all of the games
are of zero-sum game. Figure 1(b) are the zero-sum payoff matrix of the companion 2×2 games in Figure 1(a) [1].
3The random matching two-persons pair comes from the two populations respectively. The total length of a groups
playing is of 825 rounds, with 13 groups containing 12 human subjects. The 12 human subjects are split into two-
population equally in which one population play X-role and another population play Y -role. Each group plays all 7
games in the 825 rounds. The Game 1 and Game 2 are practice zero-sum game and not real game are provided to the
human subjects for training. All of the 156 subjects comes from student subject pool in University of Michigan, U.S.
The experiments are conducted in the end of 1990s. For more detail of the parameters of the 7 experimental games,
see ref. [1]
RESULTS
Gross Figural and Numerical Results
Figure 1(d), the 13 color curves are the empirical accumulate rotation La of each of the 13 groups and initial by
the 7 games respectively. The successive increasing or declining of the La means the successively counterclockwise or
clockwise rotation is observed. Numerical results see Table I. In these data, (1) in the game dimension, we explore the
consequence of the switching the payoff matrix; (2) in the human subject groups dimension, we explore the inherence
response coefficient cross the groups.
TABLE I: Empirical Accumulate Rotation (La) of the 13 Groups in the 7 Games
Group(β) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Game(α) T61 T62 T63 T64 T65 T66 T67 T68 T70 T71 T72 T73 T74 Avg. S.E.
1 -0.11 0.11 0.03 0.06 -0.14 0.14 -0.44 0.11 0.00 0.03 -0.19 0.03 -0.17 -0.04 0.16
2 -1.69 -0.81 -0.36 -0.56 -0.33 -0.5 -0.33 -0.56 -0.92 -0.14 -0.03 0.11 0.17 -0.46 0.49
3 0.89 0.67 1.47 1.89 0.78 0.81 1.17 0.39 2.53 0.72 0.97 0.72 0.89 1.07 0.58
4 0.39 -0.42 0.14 -0.17 0.56 0.14 0.36 -0.39 0.19 -0.22 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.07 0.3
5 1.25 0.86 1.03 0.94 1.11 1.14 1.58 0.53 1.39 1.72 0.44 1.31 0.61 1.07 0.39
6 -1.47 -0.92 -2.33 -1.5 -1.06 -1.25 -1.53 -2.5 -2.75 -3.06 -2.03 -2.42 -2.69 -1.96 0.71
7 -3.00 -1.31 -1.92 -2.97 -0.94 -2.61 -1.75 -1.36 -2.67 -4.33 -2.47 -1.78 -2.47 -2.28 0.9
R.R.C. 1.02 0.62 1.09 1.18 0.68 0.9 1.03 0.68 1.56 1.44 0.86 0.98 0.97 1 0.28
R.R.C. is the abbreviation of relative response coefficient (Φ.,β) of each of the 13 human subject groups. The last row is the
mean Φ.,β cross the game α = 3, 5, 6, 7. The second row (e.g., T61 to T74) is the labeled according to the session order of
original experimental record in which there is not session labeled as 69. The mean instantaneous rotation L¯ = La/T in which
T is the total round of an experimental session of a given payoff matrix.
Cross the 4 MSNE Games: Rotation Strength and Incentive
Theoretically, payoff matrix relates to the incentive of the individual in an experimental social. It is straight to
image that, payoff matrix could be links to the strength of social rotation. Different game with different payoff matrix
could have different strength of social rotation.
Numerical results of the accumulated rotation of the 13 Groups in the 7 Games are shown in Table I. Figure 3(a) are
the figural results. Both show the direction (positive is along counter-clock) and the strength of the Laα,β, respectively.
From Table I, row by row’s or game by game’s statistical analysis comes to following two results.
Result-1.1: Numerical analysis show that, the direction in the four games (each with 13 samples) are consistence
with evolutionary game theory expectations, respectively (p < 0.00). None of the 52 samples deviate the theoretical
prediction.
Result-1.2: Numerical analysis also show that, the absolutely value of the strength cross the 4 MSNE games can
be distinguished. Disregards the direction, numerical results shows that, rotation strength values of both of the Game
6 and Game 7 significant larger than those of the Game 3 and Game 5 (p < 0.01, t-test).
A potential interpretation for the strengths cross the games is given in next section.
4Cross the 13 Human Subjects Groups: Diversity of Response Coefficient
For individual, the sensitive on the incentive could be different and can be detected in game [11, 12]; For group,
the sensitives are different and detectable [13]. The diversity of response character be obtained from the observable
– the strength of social rotation.
Within Groups, there is 4 games taken into account to test the diversity on response. We do not include the Game
4, for it is not the MSNE, the observable of rotation is trivial. From Table I, column by column’s (group by group’s)
statistical analysis comes to the results: Result-2.1 and Result-2.2.
Result-2.1: Result-2.1: In the direction of rotation view, none of the 52 (13 group and the 4 games) observed
La deviates the prediction from the evolutionary game theory. The prediction of the replicator dynamics (the most
simple EGT model) for the 4 games are shown in Figure 1(c).
None of the groups deviating from EGT’s prediction. This means, in the 12 subjects systems, the social rotation
(and also Shapley-cyclic motion) directions obey the EGT. In this view, the similarity between the groups is significant.
Result-2.2: In the sensitive of the groups response in rotation view, from Table I, Figure 3(b) are the figural
results for the relative accumulated rotation Φα,β (Φα,β = L
a
α,β/L
′
α, here, L
′
α =
∑
β
Laα,β
Sβ
and sample size Sβ = 13 in
our case) cross the 13 groups and each group has 4 (α = 3, 5, 6, 7) samples, respectively. That is to say, for given β,
if Φα,β is strictly larger than 1, this suggests that, the sample β is more sensitive. Φα,β can be a quantity relating to
response coefficient of group β. Cross the games (α = 3, 5, 6, 7), the relative accumulated rotation Φ.,β of β-group is
shown in last row Table I.
We use Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test method to evaluate the groups’ response coefficient. Each
of the 13 groups is used as a group sample; in each group sample, there is 4 MSNE games’s relative rotation strength
observation.
Result shows that, the equality hypothesis can be rejected ( p < 0.05, χ2=21.330 and 12 degrees of freedom). This
result means the different is not random result of the 13 samples. The groups’ inherence (response coefficient) is
different and could be persisted cross the games.
Some samples results are: the group 62, 65 and 68 is less (Φα,β < 1 at p < 0.1 significant) sensitive to the incentives;
Alternatively, the group 70 is the most sensitive (Φα,β > 1 at p < 0.01 significant) to the payoff matrix switching.
The numeric results of the relative response coefficients (R.R.C.) can be read from the last row in Table I.
A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION FOR THE ROTATION
Trying to find out the theoretical explantation of the strength, we start from the simplest evolutionary dynamical
equation – replicate dynamics equation specified by the 2×2 payoff matrix for the two population games. Symbols in
this section is following reference [9].
On the direction of rotation. Figure 1(c) provides all 7 games pattern with the Dynamo [7]. In direction view,
all of the results from real experiment (in Game 3, 5, 6 and 7) total 52 sessions meet the theoretical model exactly
(p < 0.00). In Game 4, cross the 13 sample, 13 samples statistically not deviate from zero hypothesis (t-test >0.1)
which is expected by EGT, because, in these systems, no rotation exists.
On the strength of rotation. Theoretically, eigenvalues of the payoff matrix determine the dynamics property
like convergence and stability (e.g., [14]). This point is supported in experiments (e.g., [15]). Each 2×2 payoff
bi-matrix can be simplified to the two matrix (
0 a
b 0
)
and
(
0 c
d 0
)
as reference [9]. Then, the two matrix are multiply to satisfied the concentrations:
|a+ b| = 1 ∩ |c+ d| = 1, (2)
And the efficient payoff matrix can be obtained. As mentioned in [9], there exists an unique equilibrium (|c|, |a|) in
the interior space if and only if ab > 0 and cd > 0 (Game 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 are in this condition). If not this condition,
the dynamic equation is trivial (Game 1 and 4, the systems are not oscillating but converging to pure Nash states).
In ac < 0 case, what is interested in this report, the eigenvalues v of the Jacobian of the dynamic equation evaluated
near the unique equilibrium point can be expressed as [9],
v = ±iλ = ±i
√
abcd. (3)
5Table II is the results along above steps and shows the efficient payoff matrix elements (a, b, c, d). Table II also
shows the eigenvalues (λ) from Jacobian of replicator dynamics model of the given games. It is well known that the
eigenvalue λ direct proportion to the frequency (or angular velocity) of vibration; meanwhile, empirically [16], mean
L proportion to mean angular velocity in MSNE systems. So our theoretical expectation is:
L¯α,. ∝ λα.
Significantly, the rank of the theoretical predicted strength L¯ cross the games fit the games exactly. For visible, the
theoretical values and the experimental mean rotation values for the games are shown in Figure 1(d)-Insert subplot.
The linear relationship — L¯α vs λα — looks significant.
Before the end of this section, we have to emphasis that, the constrained payoff method suggested in Eq. 2 is only
a suggestion which needs more empirical testing, even though the results from the theoreital suggestion and results
from experimental data meet well.
TABLE II: Efficient Payoff Matrix Elements and the Eigenvalues
Game(α) a b c d |λ| Nash
1 -1 2 -2 1 – (0, 0)
2 -1/3 -2/3 1/3 2/3 0.222 (1/3, 1/3)
3 5/6 1/6 -1/6 -5/6 0.139 (1/6, 5/6)
4 4 -3 2 -3 – (1, 1)
5 2/3 1/3 -1/6 -5/6 0.176 (1/6, 2/3)
6 -1/3 -2/3 1/3 2/3 0.222 (1/3, 1/3)
7 -2/5 -3/5 2/5 3/5 0.240 (2/5, 2/5)
|λ| is the solution of the Jacobian of the constrainted replicator dynamics differential equation, e.g., ref [9]. Both of the 2-nd
strategies for the Game (α = 1) are the 3-rd strtegies; The two games (α = 1, 4) are not MSNE, the Nash are evaluated from
the companion 2×2 payoff-matrix directly.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we explain the potential application of our finding for future experimental and theoretical investi-
gations. Then we compare our finding with two recently experimental reports.
(1) Application to experimental investigation — Evolutionary game theory usually analysis mathematically
a continuous time hypothesis, however, experimental system usually not. Evaluating the dynamics in a discrete-
space and discrete-time experimental data is an approximation. Continuous strategy in population can provide more
information. Meanwhile, the scale of time is also a dimension needed to be considered. The continue time game system
has firstly been developed by Daniel Friedman group and is providing deeper understanding in game behavior [17],
and the technical development should provide a deeper experimental economics insight for EGT.
Analysis social dynamical performance on the full state space lattice emerges recently; The evolution velocity pat-
tern [18], the evolution stability [19] have been qualitatively distinguished in experiments. Meanwhile, the performance
of social in game has been linked to fluctuation theorem in statistical physics [20, 21] and fundamental principle (e.g.,
maximum entropy principle [22]) in nature science. All these regularities are found in full social strategy space. We
suggest that testing observable in full space could provide much more dynamics information form experiment data.
(2) Application to theoretical investigation—There are variety of plausible dynamics which describe adaptive
mechanisms underlying game theory. The result from the metrics of rotation can provides a novel way to evaluate
theory. Applying to test existed theorem, Minimax randomization hypothesis can be strictly rejected by the obser-
vations of rotation. Randomization hypothesis state that the player in MSNE (Game 3, 5, 6 and 7) should play full
randomly, so its prediction on rotation is strictly zero (zero-Hypothesis). The observations of rotation in all of the 52
experimental sessions strictly deviate from the zero-Hypothesis (at p < 0.000).
It is no surprise that, if quantitative observable can be indexed more efficiently, the co-play of evolutionary game
theory and experimental economics can continue. For example, the mean rotation L¯ as an empirical observable and
the velocity field (method see reference [18]) as another empirical observable, both of which can be used to evaluating
variety evolution dynamics.
(3) Comparison with the two experimental reports [26] — Recently, two experimental reports provides
empirical supporting on evolution dynamics positively which are the most relative to our report.
6The first paper is reported by Hoffman, Sieget, Nowak and Greenz (HSNG) [19]; They test the distribution dif-
ferences in three variety parameters games; In their experimental setting, one of the trajectory should be spiral in
(Good-rps), one should be in middle (Neutral-rps) and one should be spiral out (Bad-rps). They report the Bad-rps
differ from the others two and meet EGT prediction well. The difference within Good-rps and Neutral-rps can not be
distinguish in their method. The main index method is called as average distance by measure the average Euclidean
distance of social state from their theoretical equilibrium (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) by periods.
The second paper is the report from Cason, Friedman and Hopkins (CFH) [23]. The authors use two method to
distinguish the evolution pattern. The first method is the same as the average distance as HSNG (called as cycle
amplitude in CFH paper); Using this observable from experiments, the authors excludes the TASP model and illustrate
also that the parameters of the perturbed best response dynamics can be estimated.
Interesting is the second method — cycle rotation index (CRI) in CFH method. To calculate this index, a line
segment is constructed between the Nash equilibrium and the simplex edge of the strategy space of the game; The
segment serves as a ”tripwire” for counting cycles. In the stochastic processes, the social particle should passes the
segment from left or right, called as counter-clockwise transits (CCT ) or clockwise (CT ). The cycle rotation index
then is defined for each period as CRI = (CCT −CT )/(CCT +CT ) ∈ [−1, 1]. In this way, in quite wide parameters,
the existence of the cycles can be distinguished straightly.
Now we analysis the similarity and difference of the two papers and ours (WX) reported here. All these three reports
are for testing EGT. None of them rejects the predictions EGT. As point out by CFH, no rotation reported in HSNG
and so the directions of the rotation can not found in HSNG, meanwhile, both of CFH and WX report the directions of
social rotations meet EGT. Furthermore, both of CFH and WX reports relates to the rotation quantitatively. CFH’s
CRI method is more visible and less abstract, meanwhile, WX’s L¯ method has its fundament in classical physics and
has its mathematical simplicity.
in summary, better measurements of the dynamical observable should improve our understanding and developing
of EGT; Meanwhile, theoretical investigations are also more expected while the dynamical pattern are being seen in
CFH, HSNG and ours.
SUMMARY
Main findings from the zero-sum experimental games are (1) Shapley-cycles existence indeed in all of the MSNE
systems. The rotation directions are governed by evolutionary game theory. None of real game sample violates. (2)
The strength of rotation could be captured by evolutionary game theory quantitatively; (3) The dynamics inherence
of a group can persist cross the switching incentive parameter games. All above results come from the observation —
evolutionary rotation vector L — in the switching incentive zero-sum games [1].
These results can be understood as: The rotations of a motor are governed by the exogenous electric power provided;
At the same time, different motor has its own inherence dynamic property respectively. Similarly, our finding state
that, the laboratory social rotation can be controlled by the payoff matrix; meanwhile, each human subject social
motor could has its own inherence response coefficients when inner group individual interactions exist.
In the book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) state that We repeat most emphatically that our theory is
thoroughly static. A dynamic theory would unquestionably be more complete and preferable. As emphasis by Tang,
theoretical constructs must be built based on robust empirical findings [24], we wish the robust empirical dynamical
quantitative patterns reported in this letter, companion with the dynamical pattern found in variety games [12, 25],
could provide useful information and constraint for future dynamic theory of game.
We suggest that, Shapley-cycles can be more quantitatively understood, including the shapes, the directions and
the strengths, in more general game environments.
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FIG. 1: Illustration of the Experiments. Each of the 13 groups (β = 1, 2, ..., 13) play 7 games (α = 1, 2, ..., 7) and 825 periods
total. (a) From left to right, the matrix are the payoff matrix of the 7 games along total 825 experimental rounds (time, t). Time
arrows indicate the duration of the games. (b) From left to right, matrix are the companion 2×2 games to each of games [1].
(c) Phase diagrams for the replicator dynamics of above companion 2×2 payoff matrix, the theoretical expected direction of
the social rotation. Arrows in black lines indicate the direction of trajectories of the evolution. Figure is made by the game
dynamics program Dynamo [7]. The positive (+) symbol indicate the expected evolutionary direction is counterclockwise,
negative (-) is clockwise and zero (0) means no rotation. (d) The accumulate rotation La of each of the 13 groups and initial by
the 7 games respectively. The eigenvalue (calculation see text) for each game plotted in dash line in each game duration. Insert
(right-up): Theoretical expected values λ (includes the direction and the eigenvalue of the Jacobian) and the experimental
mean rotation L¯ (by rounds) values for the 5 real games in fulled dot, labeled with α (game ID).
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FIG. 2: Measurement of the Social Rotation in State Space. (a) Illustration of an instantaneous social rotation L at time t.
Supposing at time t, xt is at A(5/6, 1/6) and the next moment t+ 1, x(t+ 1) is at B(4/6, 3/6); In this jumping from A to B,
L(t):=x(t)⊗x(t+1) is equal to 11/36. If a jumping was from B to A, its L = −11/36. Except the last round, every round has
its observation of L. (b) The trajectory of the social evolution in game 7 (or 5th real game) and game 5 (or the 3rd real game)
in the experiment [1]. The two figures are reproduced from ref. [1]; Theoretically, spiral in left-hand-side should be clockwise
and in right-hand-side should be counterclockwise.
———————————————————————————————————————————————————
(a) (b)
———————————————————————————————————————————————————
−
.
03
−
.
02
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
m
e
a
n
 r
o
ta
tio
n 
pe
r−
ro
un
d
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
re
la
tiv
e 
re
sp
on
se
 c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
FIG. 3: Empirical results. (a) Figural presentation for Result-1.1 and Result-1.2. The box-plot of the mean rotation L¯α,. by
Games (α = 1, 2, ..., 7), in which Groups (β = 1, 2, ..., 13) results are pooled by the 7 games (Result 1.1 and 1.2 in text). (b)
Figural presentation for Result-2.1 and Result-2.2. Empirical Result by Groups. The box-plot of the relatively strength Φ.,β .
From left to right are Group 61-68 and Group 70-74. Each group β has 4 samples from Game 3, 5, 6 and 7. A box is the 4
values’ range of Φα,. for a given β (From left to right, β = 1, 2, ..., 13).
